The Nigerian State Is Losing Ground in Katsina — It’s Time to Invoke Section 305
The growing reports that armed bandits have negotiated peace accords with communities and local authorities across Katsina State are not just local developments — they are signals of a deeper collapse of state authority that demands urgent, constitutional action from the Presidency. If the claims that dozens of local government areas have effectively ceded authority to armed groups are true, the conditions for a presidential proclamation under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution have been met. The President must act.
What has actually happened (what reputable reporting shows)
Multiple reputable outlets report that community leaders and representatives from several local government areas in Katsina have held meetings and signed truce accords with bandit leaders as part of local “peace” initiatives. The Cable, Vanguard and Sahara Reporters have documented recent meetings and accords involving local councils and bandit representatives in parts of Katsina.
Videos and photos circulating from these meetings show heavily armed non-state actors publicly present at local government gatherings and, in some cases, brandishing weapons while negotiating — an image that many observers interpret as an assertion of parallel authority. The Guardian and other outlets have published accounts and imagery raising alarm about bandits being openly empowered at local events.
Some online reports and regional aggregators have gone further, reporting that as many as 12 local government areas have signed peace deals or participated in dialogues under which bandit leaders are treated as stakeholders. These claims have circulated widely on news sites and social platforms and are being used by commentators to argue that large swathes of Katsina are effectively outside normal state control. (Independent reports citing this number are available, though the figure has been contested and remains a subject of verification.)
At the same time, the Katsina State Government has publicly pushed back against characterizations that it is negotiating with bandits as partners in governance, and some officials insist the engagements are limited community-level peace-building under federal frameworks such as Operation Safe Corridor. These official denials and attempts to frame the engagements as controlled reconciliation efforts have also been reported.
The broader context makes these developments especially dangerous: Katsina has suffered large-scale attacks, mass kidnappings and deadly raids by armed gangs over consecutive years (e.g., major attacks and mass abductions documented by international agencies and wire services), demonstrating that the region has been in sustained, severe security crisis. That history underlines the stakes of permitting armed groups to gain local legitimacy.
Why this matters constitutionally and practically
The Nigerian Constitution explicitly empowers the President to proclaim a state of emergency when there is “an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the Federation or any part thereof to such extent as to require extraordinary measures to restore peace and security,” or when “there is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety” — among other triggers. This power exists to preserve the life, security and territorial integrity of the Federation when ordinary measures are manifestly failing.
If local governments are entering accords that effectively recognize armed bandits as governance partners, and if armed groups are operating openly and coercively within council jurisdictions, then the State’s monopoly on legitimate force — the foundation of public order and the social contract — is being replaced by a parallel, illegitimate authority. That is exactly the threshold that, in constitutional terms, can justify a proclamation under Section 305.
Evidence-based cautions (what verification shows and what remains contested)
Verified national outlets confirm that multiple LGAs have held peace meetings and that bandit leaders have been involved in local-level accords; the exact number of LGAs involved is disputed in public reporting. Some sources say five LGAs were directly involved in the most recent meeting; other aggregators and regional sites report higher tallies up to 12 LGAs. Because of the political sensitivity, the figure varies by source and should be treated carefully in public statements — but the pattern of negotiated truces across several councils is clear.
Official denials by state authorities do not, on their own, resolve the underlying reality that armed groups are publicly visible at community gatherings, that they have carried out lethal attacks and mass kidnappings in recent years, and that communities are resorting to local truces — sometimes under duress — to obtain short-term safety. Independent reporting and video evidence corroborate that armed actors are operating with visible impunity in parts of Katsina.
The risk of inaction
Allowing local settlement-with-bandits to become normalized carries these immediate dangers:
1. Entitlement for armed criminals. Treating bandit leaders as stakeholders rewards violence and encourages further armed predation.
2. Weakening of security institutions. When communities negotiate directly with criminals, the morale and role of police and the military are undermined.
3. Erosion of rule of law. Local pacts risk substituting negotiated impunity for justice for victims, including the families of those killed, abducted or dispossessed.
4. Contagion effect. If armed groups see that seizures of territory translate into political leverage, similar deals will proliferate elsewhere, further fragmenting the state. Reuters and other international outlets have documented how sustained banditry has produced cycles of mass kidnapping and terror in the region.
A measured but urgent prescription
1. Transparent verification. The Federal Government should immediately commission an independent verification — involving the Inspector-General of Police, the Defence Headquarters, and credible civil-society observers — to map which LGAs have engaged in accords with armed actors, the terms of those accords, and whether any de facto transfer of authority has occurred. (Preliminary reporting suggests multiple LGAs are affected; precise verification is required.)
2. Constitutional recourse where necessary. Where verification confirms a breakdown of public order or the existence of parallel, coercive authorities in parts of Katsina, the President has the constitutional authority under Section 305 to proclaim a state of emergency in that part of the Federation to restore lawful order, disarm combatants, and re-establish civil governance. The Constitution envisages this remedy precisely for situations where ordinary executive and legislative measures are insufficient.
3. Clear exit and remedy plan. A state of emergency — if declared — must be accompanied by a time-bound plan: disarmament verified by independent monitors, prosecution of criminal actors, reconstruction of affected communities, restoration of local government functions, and safeguards to prevent human-rights abuses during emergency operations.
4. Public accountability. Where local officials have effectively ceded authority, there must be swift investigation and accountability — so that the citizenry understands how and why trust in state institutions was lost and what will be done to reclaim it.
Conclusion
Katsina’s recent peace accords with armed actors are symptomatic of a much larger failure — years of insecurity and impatience by communities that, in the absence of prompt and effective state protection, have turned to any available option for survival. Re-legitimizing the State, protecting citizens, and dismantling the political utility of violence are constitutional obligations of the President and the federal security architecture.
The Constitution provides a lawful, extraordinary tool for a moment such as this. If, after independent verification, it is determined that public order and safety have broken down in parts of Katsina to the extent that ordinary government powers cannot restore them, the President should consider invoking Section 305 to safeguard lives, restore legitimate authority, and begin the deliberate work of rebuilding state capacity in affected communities.
The Nation’s sovereignty and the safety of its people must not be bartered away for short-term quiet. If substantial parts of a State are effectively controlled by armed groups, the Union itself is at risk — and the Constitution equips the Presidency to act before that risk becomes irreversible.
Reference:
• The Cable — “Bandits reach truce deal with community leaders in Katsina” (Oct 2025).
• Vanguard — “Bandit warlords, Katsina communities agree to lay down arms” (Oct 2025).
• The Guardian (Nigeria) — reporting on bandit presence and community-level peace talks in Katsina (Sept–Oct 2025).
• Reuters — reporting on mass attacks, kidnappings and insecurity in Katsina (2024).
• Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999): Section 305 — procedure for proclamation of a state of emergency.
#KingsleySAyindeThe Nigerian State Is Losing Ground in Katsina — It’s Time to Invoke Section 305
The growing reports that armed bandits have negotiated peace accords with communities and local authorities across Katsina State are not just local developments — they are signals of a deeper collapse of state authority that demands urgent, constitutional action from the Presidency. If the claims that dozens of local government areas have effectively ceded authority to armed groups are true, the conditions for a presidential proclamation under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution have been met. The President must act.
What has actually happened (what reputable reporting shows)
Multiple reputable outlets report that community leaders and representatives from several local government areas in Katsina have held meetings and signed truce accords with bandit leaders as part of local “peace” initiatives. The Cable, Vanguard and Sahara Reporters have documented recent meetings and accords involving local councils and bandit representatives in parts of Katsina.
Videos and photos circulating from these meetings show heavily armed non-state actors publicly present at local government gatherings and, in some cases, brandishing weapons while negotiating — an image that many observers interpret as an assertion of parallel authority. The Guardian and other outlets have published accounts and imagery raising alarm about bandits being openly empowered at local events.
Some online reports and regional aggregators have gone further, reporting that as many as 12 local government areas have signed peace deals or participated in dialogues under which bandit leaders are treated as stakeholders. These claims have circulated widely on news sites and social platforms and are being used by commentators to argue that large swathes of Katsina are effectively outside normal state control. (Independent reports citing this number are available, though the figure has been contested and remains a subject of verification.)
At the same time, the Katsina State Government has publicly pushed back against characterizations that it is negotiating with bandits as partners in governance, and some officials insist the engagements are limited community-level peace-building under federal frameworks such as Operation Safe Corridor. These official denials and attempts to frame the engagements as controlled reconciliation efforts have also been reported.
The broader context makes these developments especially dangerous: Katsina has suffered large-scale attacks, mass kidnappings and deadly raids by armed gangs over consecutive years (e.g., major attacks and mass abductions documented by international agencies and wire services), demonstrating that the region has been in sustained, severe security crisis. That history underlines the stakes of permitting armed groups to gain local legitimacy.
Why this matters constitutionally and practically
The Nigerian Constitution explicitly empowers the President to proclaim a state of emergency when there is “an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the Federation or any part thereof to such extent as to require extraordinary measures to restore peace and security,” or when “there is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety” — among other triggers. This power exists to preserve the life, security and territorial integrity of the Federation when ordinary measures are manifestly failing.
If local governments are entering accords that effectively recognize armed bandits as governance partners, and if armed groups are operating openly and coercively within council jurisdictions, then the State’s monopoly on legitimate force — the foundation of public order and the social contract — is being replaced by a parallel, illegitimate authority. That is exactly the threshold that, in constitutional terms, can justify a proclamation under Section 305.
Evidence-based cautions (what verification shows and what remains contested)
Verified national outlets confirm that multiple LGAs have held peace meetings and that bandit leaders have been involved in local-level accords; the exact number of LGAs involved is disputed in public reporting. Some sources say five LGAs were directly involved in the most recent meeting; other aggregators and regional sites report higher tallies up to 12 LGAs. Because of the political sensitivity, the figure varies by source and should be treated carefully in public statements — but the pattern of negotiated truces across several councils is clear.
Official denials by state authorities do not, on their own, resolve the underlying reality that armed groups are publicly visible at community gatherings, that they have carried out lethal attacks and mass kidnappings in recent years, and that communities are resorting to local truces — sometimes under duress — to obtain short-term safety. Independent reporting and video evidence corroborate that armed actors are operating with visible impunity in parts of Katsina.
The risk of inaction
Allowing local settlement-with-bandits to become normalized carries these immediate dangers:
1. Entitlement for armed criminals. Treating bandit leaders as stakeholders rewards violence and encourages further armed predation.
2. Weakening of security institutions. When communities negotiate directly with criminals, the morale and role of police and the military are undermined.
3. Erosion of rule of law. Local pacts risk substituting negotiated impunity for justice for victims, including the families of those killed, abducted or dispossessed.
4. Contagion effect. If armed groups see that seizures of territory translate into political leverage, similar deals will proliferate elsewhere, further fragmenting the state. Reuters and other international outlets have documented how sustained banditry has produced cycles of mass kidnapping and terror in the region.
A measured but urgent prescription
1. Transparent verification. The Federal Government should immediately commission an independent verification — involving the Inspector-General of Police, the Defence Headquarters, and credible civil-society observers — to map which LGAs have engaged in accords with armed actors, the terms of those accords, and whether any de facto transfer of authority has occurred. (Preliminary reporting suggests multiple LGAs are affected; precise verification is required.)
2. Constitutional recourse where necessary. Where verification confirms a breakdown of public order or the existence of parallel, coercive authorities in parts of Katsina, the President has the constitutional authority under Section 305 to proclaim a state of emergency in that part of the Federation to restore lawful order, disarm combatants, and re-establish civil governance. The Constitution envisages this remedy precisely for situations where ordinary executive and legislative measures are insufficient.
3. Clear exit and remedy plan. A state of emergency — if declared — must be accompanied by a time-bound plan: disarmament verified by independent monitors, prosecution of criminal actors, reconstruction of affected communities, restoration of local government functions, and safeguards to prevent human-rights abuses during emergency operations.
4. Public accountability. Where local officials have effectively ceded authority, there must be swift investigation and accountability — so that the citizenry understands how and why trust in state institutions was lost and what will be done to reclaim it.
Conclusion
Katsina’s recent peace accords with armed actors are symptomatic of a much larger failure — years of insecurity and impatience by communities that, in the absence of prompt and effective state protection, have turned to any available option for survival. Re-legitimizing the State, protecting citizens, and dismantling the political utility of violence are constitutional obligations of the President and the federal security architecture.
The Constitution provides a lawful, extraordinary tool for a moment such as this. If, after independent verification, it is determined that public order and safety have broken down in parts of Katsina to the extent that ordinary government powers cannot restore them, the President should consider invoking Section 305 to safeguard lives, restore legitimate authority, and begin the deliberate work of rebuilding state capacity in affected communities.
The Nation’s sovereignty and the safety of its people must not be bartered away for short-term quiet. If substantial parts of a State are effectively controlled by armed groups, the Union itself is at risk — and the Constitution equips the Presidency to act before that risk becomes irreversible.
Reference:
• The Cable — “Bandits reach truce deal with community leaders in Katsina” (Oct 2025).
• Vanguard — “Bandit warlords, Katsina communities agree to lay down arms” (Oct 2025).
• The Guardian (Nigeria) — reporting on bandit presence and community-level peace talks in Katsina (Sept–Oct 2025).
• Reuters — reporting on mass attacks, kidnappings and insecurity in Katsina (2024).
• Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999): Section 305 — procedure for proclamation of a state of emergency.
#KingsleySAyinde
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